Although some studies (e.g., Cort 2000) had cautioned against reading the Jaina theory of non-onesidedness (anekāntavāda) as exclusively advocating intellectual nonviolence (ahiṃsā) or tolerance, the 'tolerance' account still continues to reappear and circulate—though less frequently than before and much more among the Jains than the scholarly community. In revisiting this debate, the paper engages with the epistemology of disagreement and raises a crucial question: is it possible for the practitioners of non-onesidedness to have genuine disagreements? And some further complicated questions to add to it—what is the nature of such disagreements: are they absolute or conditional? Does non-onesidedness involve an obligation to agree more and disagree less? Is there an approach that goes beyond the standard dichotomy presented by the binary of 'agreement' and 'disagreement'? Is it possible to disagree with those who are worthy of respect? In framing an answer to these questions and also exploring the concepts of 'epistemic superior', 'epistemic peer' and 'epistemic inferior' in the Jaina context, this paper revisits some of the core elements of anekāntavāda. The paper also contributes to the Jaina response to religious pluralism and concludes with a more fundamental question: is it too evil to disagree?

In my presentation I will discuss the problem of the relationship between language and cognition in Anantavīrya’s thought (11/12th c. CE) as expressed in the Sanskrit treatise Parīkṣâmukha-laghu-vṛtti (PĀLV, ‘Accessible Commentary to the «Introduction to [Logical] Analysis»’) providing a commentary to the Parīkṣâmukha(-sūtra) (PĀ, ‘Introduction to [Logical] Analysis’) by Māṇikyanandin (9th/10th c. CE), particularly to the passages PĀLV 3.95–3.97. I will focus on the following issues: the relationship between the statement of an authoritative person and its relation to cognition of a thing (where a large part of the analysis is occupied by a consideration of the authorship and validity of the Vedas), the issue of innate intention of the speaker (or the author of the statement) as well as of the semantic relationship between the word and the thing based on convention and the problem of word meaning in the light of the discussion with the Buddhist theory of the exclusion (apoha) of the other (Diṅnāga, Dharmakīrti). These issues have been discussed in PĀLV at exceptional length (particularly PĀLV 3.95 and 3.97), even though PĀLV is a rather concise work and such extended arguments are scarce in it. The significance of this exception will also become the subject of this discussion. The presentation will give the audience an opportunity to familiarise themselves with the philosophical interpretation contained in the lesser-known commentary on PĀ, providing space for possible further comparison between it and that of another commentary, Prabhācandra’s Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa (PKM, ‘The Lotus-like Sun [revealing] Cognisable Objects’).